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Proposal for a Treaty to Apply the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Solution to the 
Corporate Criminal Problem in 
Private Military and Security Companies 
EVYENIA ZAFERIS 
“[T]ragedy.”1 “[M]assacre.”2 “[M]aiming of innocents.”3 These are 
just a few of the words used to describe the events of September 16, 2007, 
which occurred in Nisour Square, an affluent neighborhood of Baghdad, 
Iraq.4 Automatic weapons, heavy machine guns, grenade launchers and 
sniper fire were used to inundate a crowded traffic circle.5 Depicted as a 
scene of horror and confusion, dozens of Iraqis took cover from the 
downpour of metal coming from American armored trucks.6 What at first 
glance appears to be an unfortunate reality of war all too common on the 
battlefield, in actuality portrays a criminal act against Iraqi civilians 
perpetrated by U.S. contractors. 
On that day, Blackwater security guards killed seventeen Iraqi 
civilians, including a nine-year-old boy, and wounded many others.7 The 
 
 Evyenia (Nia) Zaferis, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Juris Doctor, May 2018. Chief Articles 
Editor, Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, Volume 41. Many thanks 
to my parents and brother, Ernie, for their unwavering support and love. A special thank you to my 
DC family for introducing me to our justice system, inspiring me to be my best self, and always 
having my back. 
 1. Nicky Woolf, Former Blackwater Guards Sentenced for Massacre of Unarmed Iraqi 
Civilians, THE GUARDIAN, (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/13/
former-blackwater-guards-sentencing-baghdad-massacre. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Blackwater Incident: What Happened, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/7033332.stm. 
 5. James Risen, Before Shooting in Iraq, a Warning on Blackwater, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/us/before-shooting-in-iraq-warning-on-blackwater.
html; Matt Apuzzo, Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html. 
 6. Apuzzo, supra note 5. 
 7. Risen, supra note 5; Apuzzo, supra note 5. 
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four individuals ultimately held responsible were among the nineteen 
Blackwater guards in a convoy providing security for U.S. State 
Department officials in Iraq.8 While Blackwater claimed its employees 
acted in self-defense,9 at the ten-week long trial back on U.S. soil, no 
witnesses testified they saw the guards come under fire.10 
Nearly seven years after the killings, three of the guards were found 
guilty of manslaughter charges in U.S. federal court and subsequently 
sentenced to thirty years in prison.11 The team’s sniper, who was the first 
to open fire, was convicted on a separate charge of first-degree murder 
and later sentenced to life in prison.12 It should be noted that in August 
2017, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit ordered a new trial for the sniper and ruled that the three 
guards be resentenced.13 
But what about the company? Despite becoming the subject of 
multiple U.S. Justice Department investigations, Blackwater and its 
executives effectively “survived.”14 However, public outrage over what 
has marked a “bloody nadir” in America’s war in Iraq did contribute to 
the company’s ultimate demise.15 Eventually Blackwater lost its 
government contracts and was “renamed, sold and renamed again”16— a 
seemingly small price to pay when four of its employees will be spending 
decades behind bars. As it stands today, there is no effective way to hold 
the executives of companies like Blackwater responsible for the actions 
of the men they breed and rely upon. 
 
 8. Spencer S. Hsu & Victoria St. Martin, Four Blackwater Guards Sentenced in Iraq 
Shootings of 31 Unarmed Civilians, THE WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/crime/four-blackwater-guards-sentenced-in-iraq-shootings-of-31-
unarmed-civilians/2015/04/13/55b777e0-dee4-11e4-be40-566e2653afe5_story.html; see also 
Amy Davidson, A Life Sentence for a Blackwater Murder, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/a-life-sentence-for-a-blackwater-murder. 
 9. Iraq Battle Was Self-Defense, Security Firm Says, CNN (Sept. 18, 2007), http://www.cnn.
com/2007/WORLD/meast/09/17/iraq.main/index.html. 
 10. Hsu & St. Martin, supra note 8; see also Matt Apuzzo, Witnesses Testify Against Ex-
Blackwater Colleagues in Case of 2007 Iraq Killings, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/us/politics/witnesses-testify-against-ex-blackwater-
colleagues-in-case-of-2007-iraq-killings.html?_r=0. 
 11. Woolf, supra note 1. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Spencer S. Hsu, Murder Conviction in Blackwater Case Thrown Out, Other Sentences 
Overturned, THE WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/murder-conviction-in-blackwater-case-thrown-out-other-sentences-
overturned/2017/08/04/a14f275c-792e-11e7-9eac-
d56bd5568db8_story.html?utm_term=.4dfe4af1c635. 
 14. Apuzzo, supra note 5. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), like 
Blackwater, has grown exponentially over the years.17 While efforts are 
made to regulate the conduct of these companies, no uniform method of 
enforcement or punishment for wrongdoing exists across all states. This 
article focuses on creating a solution to the lack of corporate criminal 
accountability for PMSCs. Specifically, this article suggests an 
international treaty that calls upon states to create domestic legislation 
modeled after the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). 
The legislation would allow states to prosecute these corporations for 
egregious crimes and human rights violations perpetrated by contractors 
extraterritorially, just as the FCPA allows the U.S. to prosecute the 
bribery of foreign officials. 
While the FCPA is not entirely unique in its existence as a domestic 
statute with the ability to criminalize conduct overseas, it has proven to 
be an effective means of doing so.18 A treaty is necessary because while 
the United States could implement such legislation on its own, that is not 
enough to ensure that other states will follow suit. Leading the way for 
others has its limits, and a treaty would allow individual states to give 
input as to the exact language to be incorporated, as well as the precise 
prosecutorial mechanism. 
Part I will explore the background of PMSCs and the reasons for 
their rise in prominence over the years, especially noting the historically 
profit-driven motivation of private military actors, primarily mercenaries. 
Part II will discuss a few of the various and unsuccessful ways the 
international legal community has attempted to address the issue of 
regulating PMSCs. And Part III will describe how the FCPA came into 
existence, detail what it prohibits and explain why it provides a model 
that can be adapted and implemented by states in their own domestic laws 
in order to regulate PMSCs. Part III also recognizes recent efforts made 
by the United States to criminalize corporate wrongdoing. Part IV 
examines some of the practical details of this proposed treaty, such as 
jurisdiction and superior liability. 
  
 
 17. See infra Section I.C. 
 18. See infra. Section III 
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I. BACKGROUND OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES 
A. Historical Background of Profit-Driven Military Actors 
While “private, profit-driven military actors” are nearly as old as 
war itself, the “modern private security industry is unprecedented in its 
scale and sophistication.”19 Throughout history, from Ancient Times in 
Mesopotamia and Greece, into the Middle Ages and even somewhat 
during the Age of Reason, employing private warriors was a significantly 
widespread practice.20 Historically, the term “mercenary” has been 
“understood to mean an individual hired to exercise violence on behalf of 
its client(s) in return for financial gain.”21 Notably, the meaning of the 
word mercenary is said to be dependent on the “spirit of the age.”22 
Whatever the meaning, it is agreed upon that division of labor and 
specialization of skill are considered significant milestones in 
humankind.23 Those with the ability to carry out specialized functions 
both efficiently and effectively became “indispensable for human 
society.”24 The fact that war can be considered a “constant in human 
history” and armed conflicts have “formed an integral part of the human 
condition,” those possessing specialized skills in carrying out military 
activities have been able sell their services for centuries.25 Unsurprisingly, 
“individuals fighting in wars for remuneration—mercenaries—have 
always formed an integral part of the social and political history of 
warfare.”26 These mercenaries could market their services not only to 
“local rulers and other wealthy persons,” but also to “foreign 
customers.”27 
The idea that a mercenary’s allegiance was contingent upon 
monetary compensation, as opposed to national loyalty and obedience,28 
contributed to the negative connotation surrounding the practice. 
Mercenaries have been referred to as “hired killers,” “dogs of war,” or 
even “heartless soldiers of fortune.”29 However, mercenaries are not alone 
in their for-profit related condemnation. 
 
 19. HANNAH TONKIN, STATE CONTROL OVER PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY 
COMPANIES IN ARMED CONFLICT 6 (2011). 
 20. See EVGENI MOYAKINE, THE PRIVATIZED ART OF WAR 47-58 (2015). 
 21. Id. at 47. 
 22. M.P.W. BROUWERS, MERCENARIES AND LAW 2 (2011). 
 23. MOYAKINE, supra note 20, at 47. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 48. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. BROUWERS, supra note 22, at 1.  
 29. Id. 
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That is, naval warfare has roots in financial motivation as well. 
Specifically, the use of privateers, prevalent since the Middle Ages, was 
eventually banned by a treaty in 1856, known as the Declaration of 
Paris.30 Privateers were “privately owned and operated ships, licensed to 
cruise the oceans, forcibly capture enemy merchant vessels and cargo, 
and bring them back to port, where the captured property was auctioned 
and a share granted to the privateer’s owner, who divided it by contract 
with the crew.”31 The incentive to overreach is evident from the nature of 
the practice itself. The obvious greed factor, coupled with the difficulty 
in regulating conduct on the open sea, led to the ultimate abolition of 
privateering. 
While almost all European powers had renounced privateering by 
the mid-nineteenth century, the United States declined to do so.32 In fact, 
the U.S. government refused to sign the Declaration of Paris, “declaring 
that privateering was crucial to its national security.”33 This was in part 
because during the War of 1812, the “principal U.S. offensive strategy at 
sea was to interfere with enemy commerce.”34 In order to execute that 
approach, the government “relied upon several hundred privateers,” and 
only a “mere twenty-two publicly owned naval cruisers”—interestingly, 
the “private forces captured eight times as many enemy vessels as did the 
public ones.”35 Despite its apparent effectiveness, eventually, “the 
practice just dropped out of view;” however, the United States never 
“formally or officially abandon[ed] privateering.”36 
B. Mercenaries and the Law 
Much like its refusal to sign the 1856 Declaration of Paris, the 
United States has not ratified the United Nations Mercenary 
Convention.37 Before diving into the UN Mercenary Convention itself, it 
is important to first understand the evolution of international law as it 
relates to mercenaries, beginning with the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907. These international “peace conferences were characterized” by 
 
 30. Nicholas Parrillo, The De-Privatization of American Warfare: How the U.S. Government 
Used, Regulated, and Ultimately Abandoned Privateering in the Nineteenth Century, 19 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 1, 1 (2007). 
 31. Id. at 2. 
 32. Id. at 50. 
 33. Id. at 2. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 3-4. 
 36. Id. at 4. 
 37. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries, Dec. 4, 1989, 2163 U.N.T.S. 75 [hereinafter UN Mercenary Convention] (listing 
names of states, and dates of signature and ratification). 
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their “purely humanitarian concern[s],” which translated into two 
principles built on “solving disputes in a peaceful manner, instead of 
acting by means of aggression.”38 An “obligation to respect neutrality 
[was] codified” and the “rights and duties of neutral powers and persons 
in land warfare” were set out in the Hague Convention of 1907.39 
“Provisions against the recruitment of mercenaries on national territory 
were included” in the Convention because a state allowing its territory to 
be used for such purposes was “deemed in support of a belligerent,” and 
thus potentially “drawn into a conflict” in which it has no interest.40 
Articles 4, 5 and 17 provide some of the obligations of neutral states, like 
outlawing both the formation of corps of combatants and the opening of 
recruitment agencies on the “territory of a neutral power to assist the 
belligerent.”41 
The “attitude of the international community towards mercenaries 
changed” after the establishment of the United Nations, following World 
War II.42 This shift can be attributed to the recognition of the “right to 
self-determination,” as set forth in the main purposes and principles of 
the UN Charter.43 While the creation of the UN Charter brought about 
changes to the “law regulating the use of force in international politics,” 
a “legal development” as it related to mercenaries did not occur at this 
time due to preoccupation with the Cold War.44 
The 1960s brought a heightening of the international community’s 
interest in mercenaries, specifically due to decolonization in Africa.45 
Initially, the response was limited to merely “reaffirming the implications 
of article 2(4)” of the UN Charter, which states: 
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against a territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the purpose of the United Nations.46 
However, by the late 1960s the UN General Assembly declared, 
“that the use of mercenaries against national liberation movements 
fighting for independence in colonial territories is a criminal act.”47 And 
 
 38. BROUWERS, supra note 22, at 3. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 4. 
 42. Id. 
 43. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2; see also BROUWERS, supra note 22, at 4. 
 44. BROUWERS, supra note 22, at 4. 
 45. Id. at 4-5. 
 46. Id. at 5; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 47. BROUWERS, supra note 22, at 5. 
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in 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration that confirmed 
a state’s “duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization 
of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion 
into the territory of another state.”48 A few years later, the legal status of 
a mercenary was defined by the General Assembly in 1973: 
[T]he use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the 
national liberation movements struggling for their freedom and 
independence from the yoke of colonialism and alien domination is 
considered to be a criminal act and mercenaries should accordingly be 
punished as criminals.49 
The next significant development in the legal status of mercenaries 
was the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
which “illustrated the legal position of mercenaries” in Article 47.50 
It is important to note, “Additional Protocol I only applies to 
international armed conflicts.”51 Additionally, while the International 
Committee of the Red Cross believes “Article 47 is customary 
international humanitarian law,” the United States does not consider it to 
be of “customary legal status.”52 To be classified as a mercenary, one 
must meet all six requirements as set forth below. Article 47(2) states: 
(2) A mercenary is any person who: 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
conflict; 
(d) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire 
for private gain and, in fact, is promised by or on behalf of a Party to 
the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that 
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the 
armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of 
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces.53 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 6. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 47, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
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The language of the definition has received criticism for its “tightly 
drawn” nature,54 and understandably so. On its face, this specific and 
narrow definition leaves much room for an individual to argue against his 
classification as a mercenary. For example, legally proving an alleged 
mercenary’s motivation sounds like a near impossible feat. 
Several efforts were made to explicitly address the mercenary 
problems in Africa. Specifically, the 1972 Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, was 
“primarily aimed to stop mercenaries from Europe” from “fight[ing] in 
conflicts all over Africa.”55 These mercenaries were “instructed and paid 
by minority governments of Rhodesia and South Africa.”56 Much like the 
UN resolutions discussed above, “this Convention also made states 
responsible for the prohibition and punishment of mercenary activities 
taking place in their jurisdiction.”57 Furthermore, in contrast to the 
“traditional view that states are individually accountable,” this 
Convention emphasized a “collective responsibility towards 
accountability” by “placing an obligation on individuals who meet its 
requirement.”58 This requirement can be met by satisfying the criteria as 
laid out in the Convention’s own definition of a mercenary; additionally, 
the requirement can be met by “fulfill[ing] the criteria of those people 
who recruit or assist mercenaries through training, financial support, or 
by preventing alleged mercenaries to be prosecuted.”59 
Following the 1972 OAU Convention and the trial of several 
captured alleged mercenaries in Angola, the Draft Convention of the 
Prevention and Suppression of Mercenarism was created by the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Mercenaries in 1976.60 One of 
the most significant things to come out of this Convention hails from 
Article 4, which “deprived mercenaries of the status of being a lawful 
combatant,” thus not affording captured mercenaries the “protected status 
of [a] prisoner-of-war.”61 This idea was later incorporated into the 1977 
Geneva Additional Protocol I.62 Shortly after Additional Protocol I was 
adopted, the OAU adopted the 1977 Convention for the Elimination of 
 
 54. See BROUWERS, supra note 22, at 10. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 10–11. 
 60. See BROUWERS, supra note 22, at 11. 
 61. Id. at 12. 
 62. Id. 
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Mercenarism in Africa.63 The definition of mercenary in the 1977 OAU 
Convention differs from the definition provided in the 1972 Convention 
in that it integrates the six criteria from Additional Protocol I, 
notwithstanding some differences in formulation.64 
Ultimately, the UN Mercenary Convention, originally called the 
“International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and 
Training of Mercenaries,” was adopted in April of 1989 and entered into 
force in October of 2001.65 As mentioned above, the United States is not 
a party to this Convention;66 further, none of the permanent members of 
the UN Security Council, China, Russia, the United Kingdom and France, 
are parties to the Convention either.67 
Naturally, the UN Mercenary Convention contains a definition of 
mercenary—the definition is effectively the same as the one found in 
Additional Protocol I, with a minor exception that can be found in a later 
article within the Convention.68 Critics have noted the “similarities in the 
definition[s]” translate to “similar problems;” they have also pointed out 
that the “cumulative criteria” makes it nearly “impossible to apply the 
legal definition of a mercenary to an alleged mercenary.”69 Additionally, 
the definition applies to both international armed conflicts, as well as 
internal armed conflicts.70 The Convention has received criticism because 
of the “low number of state parties,” but it is almost understandable 
because many states do not wish to “delegate any control over their 
national security”71—much like the United States’ stance on privateering. 
Other concerns include the difficulty associated with proving motivation, 
touched on above, as well as a “lack of enforcement mechanism and the 
lack of monitoring procedures.”72 
C. Modern-day PMSCs 
As mentioned above, after the 1960s, “norms against the use of 
mercenaries began to manifest themselves.”73 At that time, international 
law was confronted with the ongoing challenge of attempting to regulate 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. UN Mercenary Convention, supra note 37. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Id.; see also BROUWERS, supra note 22, at 14. 
 68. BROUWERS, supra note 22, at 14. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 15. 
 72. Id. at 16. 
 73. MOYAKINE supra note 20, at 59. 
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and limit the scope of the problem.74 Many ex-soldiers sold their expertise 
to “states, rebel movements, or companies functioning in dangerous areas 
of the world, such as Latin America and Africa.”75 The early 1990s mark 
the emergence of PMSCs as they are known today.76 Various rationales 
are cited for the “rapid growth and consolidation of the industry.”77 
The end of the Cold War is regularly acknowledged as the impetus 
for the proliferation and expansion of the private military and security 
market. Global order changed dramatically after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, which “had major consequences for the global market of force 
with its supply and demand of military and security services.”78 Three of 
the consequences are oft-cited. First, the “world experienced an increase 
in the levels of global violence and the occurrence of many conflicts” 
after the United States and the Soviet Union “ceased to provide order and 
to exercise control over the regions of instability,” because of fears of 
nuclear proliferation.79 Second, many “non-State conflict groups, such as 
terrorist organizations, rebel movements and drug cartels emerged” 
worldwide, making it difficult for the international community “to 
regulate and to suppress them.”80 Third, the end of the Cold War “led 
states to downsize their armed forces.”81 Consequently, numerous 
professional soldiers were available for hire, and many of them had little 
to offer outside of their military skills.82 Many weak nations “sought help 
from privately run organizations providing military and security 
services” because they were unable to “effectively exercise control over 
their sovereign territories” or “secure their borders.”83 
Another reason for the rise of PMSCs is embedded within “modern 
warfare itself.”84 Changes and innovations required the need for experts, 
and private companies were able to offer the “best technology and 
expertise.”85 “Information dominance and technical expertise” became 
critical to modern warfare.86 Further, the “privatization revolution,” 
which came about in the 1980s, “created fertile ground for privatizing 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Tonkin, supra note 19, at 13. 
 77. Id. 
 78. MOYAKINE, supra note 20, at 60. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. TONKIN, supra note 19, at 13. 
 82. Id. 
 83. MOYAKINE, supra note 20, at 61. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 61–62. 
 86. Id. at 62. 
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many governmental functions” and the “establishment of private 
enterprises capable of carrying them out.”87 
The idea of privatizing government functions is “currently a matter 
of fact.”88 Putting a number on the amount of spending associated with 
government contractors would undoubtedly be a herculean task, at least 
as far as the United States is concerned. As for American PMSC spending 
in particular, the number is in the billions and regularly accounts for a 
significant portion of the federal budget.89 From 2007-2012 alone, the 
Department of Defense spent approximately $160 billion on private 
security contractors for various services in Iraq and Afghanistan.90 War is 
a business, and quite a lucrative one for PMSCs. At the end of the day, 
PMSCs are “for-profit enterprises” with the “main motivation 
of…maximizing their financial gain,” like any other private company.91 
Unlike their mercenary predecessors, today’s PMSCs have an 
“obvious corporate structure, are tied to corporate holdings and financial 
markets, and have the main motive of maximizing business rather than 
individual profit.”92 However, it is that very corporate structure that 
remains unregulated, or at most self-regulated, as touched on more below. 
The corporate greed and the desire to increase profits through bigger and 
better contracts is exactly why these companies’ leaders need to be held 
accountable when their subordinates commit atrocious crimes. 
 II. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC EFFORTS TO REGULATE 
Over the years, efforts have been made to address the various issues 
posed by PMSCs. Unfortunately, none of these efforts have chiefly 
focused on holding the corporations themselves, or their leaders, 
responsible for the criminal acts perpetrated by their underlings. Rather 
than create specific mechanisms for punishing wrongdoing, states have 
instead concentrated on compiling guidelines and recommendations for 
good practice, such as the Montreux Document, discussed more fully 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 62–63. 
 89. See David Isenberg, Showing the Private Military Contracting Sector the Money, Redux, 
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 2, 2011, 12:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg
/military-contracting_b_1123328.html. 
 90. Amol Mehra, Who’s Guarding Whom? Private Security Contractors and the Need for 
Government Action, THE HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/amol-mehra/whos-guarding-whom-privat_b_5606148.html; see also MOSHE SCHWARTZ & 
JENNIFER CHURCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43074, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S USE OF 
CONTRACTORS TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS: BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS, AND ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS 2 (2013). 
 91. MOYAKINE, supra note 20, at 67. 
 92. Id. at 68. 
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below.93 Other international attempts include the creation of the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, 
which is a multi-stakeholder initiative aimed mostly at the self-regulation 
of PMSCs.94 While this approach is idyllic, it is not the most practical or 
concrete method to attacking the problem. The United States, however, 
has endeavored to tackle the matter by implementing domestic legislation 
in the form of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA).95 
Despite MEJA’s good intentions, it too falls short of providing a proper 
solution and is rarely employed. 
A. The Montreux Document 
The Montreux Document is the result of a joint-initiative launched 
by Switzerland and the International Committee for the Red Cross.96 The 
Swiss initiative, finalized in September 2008, “brought together 
[seventeen] governments from various regions of the world and drew 
upon the knowledge of industry representatives, academic experts and 
non-governmental organizations.”97 According to the Document itself, 
this is the first time an “intergovernmental statement clearly articulates 
the most pertinent international legal obligations with regard to 
PMSCs.”98 The Document also claims to debunk the “prevailing 
misconception that private contractors operate in a legal vacuum.”99 
Essentially, the Montreux Document is “intended to promote 
respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law 
whenever PMSCs are present in armed conflicts.”100 The Document 
emphasizes that it is “not legally binding,” but rather it “contains a 
compilation of relevant international legal obligations and good 
practices.”101 
Part One of the Document focuses on the pertinent international 
legal obligations. This section begins by “highlight[ing] the 
responsibilities of three types of States: Contracting states (countries that 
hire PMSCs), Territorial States (countries on whose territory PMSCs 
 
 93. See infra Section II.A. 
 94. See infra Section II.B. 
 95. See infra Section II.C. 
 96. TONKIN, supra note 19, at 35. 
 97. The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good 
Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During 
Armed Conflict, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 5 (Aug. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/
files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf [hereinafter Montreux Document]. 
 98. Id. at 5. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 31. 
 101. Id. 
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operate) and Home States (countries in which PMSCs are based).”102 Part 
One concludes with a note on “Superior Responsibility.”103 Specifically, 
it reads: 
Superiors of PMSC personnel, such as: 
a) governmental officials, whether they are military commanders or 
civilian superiors, or 
b) directors or managers of PMSCs, may be liable for crimes under 
international law committed by PMSC personnel under their effective 
authority and control, as a result of their failure to properly exercise 
control over them, in accordance with the rules of international law. 
Superior responsibility is not engaged solely by virtue of a contract.104 
Despite the fact that it does not offer a mechanism through which to 
do so, the inclusion of this portion on superior responsibility bolsters the 
idea that those in positions of power and authority should also be held 
accountable. 
Part Two of the Document contains a non-exhaustive list of non-
legally binding “good practices that aims to provide guidance and 
assistance to States in ensuring respect for international humanitarian law 
and human rights law.”105 In light of the fact that in recent years, both the 
United States and Israel “have contested the general applicability of 
[human rights law] to armed conflict,” this public affirmation that 
international humanitarian law and human rights law apply concurrently 
in armed conflict is particularly significant.106 
For the purposes of this article, three of the “good practices” are 
especially noteworthy. Good Practice number 19 states: 
To provide for criminal jurisdiction in their national legislation over 
crimes under international law and their national law committed by 
PMSCs and their personnel and, in addition, to consider establishing: 
a) corporate criminal responsibility for crimes committed by the 
PMSC, consistent with the Contracting State’s national legal system; 
b) criminal jurisdiction over serious crimes committed by PMSC 
personnel abroad.107 
Good Practice number 71 contains identical language to number 19, 
with the exception of replacing “Contracting State’s” with “Home 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 15. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 16; see also Faiza Patel, A Primer on Legal Developments Regarding Private 
Military Contractors, LAWFARE BLOG (July 18, 2014, 4:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
primer-legal-developments-regarding-private-military-contractors. 
 106. TONKIN, supra note 19, at 145. 
 107. Montreux Document, supra note 97, at 19. 
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State’s.”108 Good Practice number 49 also contains very similar language, 
but is in reference to “Territorial State’s.”109 These suggestions coincide 
quite well with the idea of creating a criminal statute with extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, which will be discussed later. 
B. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 
As a sort of follow-up to the Montreux Document, the International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) was 
created in 2010.110 While also the brainchild of the Swiss, this project 
differed from the Montreux Document in that it was more “industry 
driven.”111 The ICoC was launched with the “over-arching objectives to 
articulate human rights responsibilities of private security companies 
(PSCs), and to set out international principles and standards for the 
responsible provision of private security services, particularly when 
operating in complex environments.”112 As a “multi-stakeholder process,” 
it involved representatives from a number of private companies, industry 
associations, civil society organizations, as well as “government 
representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Afghanistan, Switzerland and the Council of the European Union.”113 The 
ICoC was finalized in November 2010, and was initially signed by fifty-
eight private security companies.114 By September 2013, 708 companies 
had “formally committed to operate in accordance with the Code of 
Conduct.”115 
Section B of the ICoC contains a number of definitions that are 
“applicable to the activities of ‘Private Security Companies’ (PSCs) that 
have signed and agreed to operate in compliance with” the Code’s 
principles and standards.116 According to the Code, a PSC is “any 
Company whose business activities include the provision of Security 
Services either on its own behalf or on behalf of another, irrespective of 
 
 108. Id. at 27. 
 109. Id. at 24. 
 110. CORINNA SEIBERTH, PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 159, 161 (2014). 
 111. Id. 
 112. History, INT’L CODE OF CONDUCT ASS’N, https://icoca.ch/en/history (last visited Oct. 20, 
2017). 
[hereinafter History]. 
 113. SEIBERTH, supra note 110, at 161. 
 114. History, supra note 112. 
 115. Id. 
 116. ICoC, The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, Section 
B. Definitions, available at https://icoca.ch/en/the_icoc [hereinafter Section B. Definitions]; 
SEIBERTH, supra note 110, at 162. 
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how such Company describes itself.”117 Security Services are defined as 
the “guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, 
facilities, designated sites, property or other places (whether armed or 
unarmed), or any other activity for which the Personnel of Companies are 
required to carry or operate a weapon in the performance of their 
duties.”118 
Notably, even though the Code builds upon the foundations of the 
Montreux Document, there is no uniform use of terminology.119 
Moreover, the Montreux Document itself explicitly “avoids any strict 
delimitation between private military and private security companies,” 
specifically acknowledging the lack of a “standard definition” of “what 
is a military company” versus “what is a security company.”120 The 
Montreux Document reasons that “many companies provide a wide range 
of services” which can spread across the two categories, going on to say 
that labeling is less relevant than the “specific services” a company 
“provides in a particular instance.”121 That idea is reflected in the Code’s 
definition of PSC, specifically through the “irrespective of” language 
cited above.122 The Code does not use the term Private Military and 
Security Company (PMSC) but uses the term Private Security Companies 
(PSC); this is likely because from an industry perspective, being labeled 
as a PMSC still carries the negative connotation of the mercenary-like 
military companies active in the 1990s.123 
The ICoC “process foresaw the establishment of an independent 
mechanism for governance and oversight” from jump street.124 A “multi-
stakeholder committee” was formed, “supported by working groups on 
different subject areas,” and the “final oversight mechanism was 
endorsed by agreement in the form of Articles of Association at a drafting 
conference in February 2013.”125 While the development of a monitoring 
body is encouraging, the ICoCA is criticized for “lack[ing] any kind of 
serious enforcement mechanism.”126 More than anything else, the ICoC 
“itself embodies the policy commitment to respect human rights.”127 
 
 117. Section B. Definitions, supra note 116. 
 118. Id. 
 119. SEIBERTH, supra note 110, at 163. 
 120. Montreux Document, supra note 97, at 38. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Section B. Definitions, supra note 116. 
 123. SEIBERTH, supra note 110, at 163. 
 124. See History, supra note 112. 
 125. SEIBERTH, supra note 110, at 162. 
 126. Reema Shah, Beating Blackwater: Using Domestic Legislation to Enforce the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Military Companies, 123 YALE L.J. 2559, 2559 (2014). 
 127. SEIBERTH, supra note 110, at 165. 
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The authority and effectiveness of the Code “depends on how 
closely it sticks to the scope of binding international law as its foundation 
and on the consequences that may arise from a breach of the Code.”128 
The former has been deemed “problematic because the Code not only 
formulates corporate human rights expectations,” but simultaneously 
“creates rights” by “providing rules on the use of force.”129 This creates 
an issue as far as the ICoC being the “sole regulatory foundation,” 
because the “industry cannot promulgate its own rights with respect to 
the use of force.”130 That is within the domain of the state, as the “holder 
of the monopoly on the use of force.”131 Because the state determines the 
“limits of use of force for individuals,” it “must do the same for 
PMSCs.”132 
Both the Montreux Document and the ICoC are steps in the right 
direction, but they are individually and collectively insufficient to entirely 
solve the PMSC regulation problem. Depending on state and corporate 
practice in response to the Montreux Document and the Code, it could 
create “pressure from within the industry for companies to comply with 
its provisions, to prevent negative impacts on human rights and to 
improve accountability for wrongful conduct beyond mere self-
regulation.”133 Nevertheless, the ICoC can “only indirectly address gaps 
and grey zones with respect to state obligations and only in the context of 
contracting practices, where it could become a prerequisite for 
contracting states.”134 The ICoC merely has the potential to fill the gap of 
corporate responsibility by “implementing the responsibility to 
respect.”135 However, as noted above, the ICoC “cannot replace 
additional domestic legislation on PMSCs, because the industry cannot 
give itself rights and duties, such rights and duties need to be firmly 
within international human rights law and authorized through domestic 
state legislation.”136 
C. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
In an attempt to fill the jurisdictional gap left in the law for crimes 
committed by American civilians while accompanying the Armed Forces 
 
 128. Id. at 166. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 190. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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abroad, 137 Congress created the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
of 2000 (MEJA).138 MEJA is the “primary statutory vehicle for criminal 
prosecution of private military contractors.”139 Essentially, MEJA 
criminalizes conduct committed outside of the United States if such 
conduct would be considered an “offense punishable by imprisonment 
for more than one year” “had [it] been engaged within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”140 The law 
applies, in pertinent part, to conduct engaged in by those “while 
employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United 
States.”141 
MEJA provides several definitions in section 3267.142 For example, 
“employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States” is broken 
down by the categories of: (i) “a civilian employee;” (ii) “a contractor 
(including subcontractor at any tier);” or (iii) “an employee of a 
contractor (or subcontractor at any tier),” of either (1) “the Department 
of Defense” or (2) “any other Federal agency, or any provisional 
authority, to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission 
of the Department of Defense overseas.”143 The original language did not 
include any federal agencies beyond the Department of Defense, which 
is a clear limitation to the act’s reach.144 However, even the 2004 
amendment, which added the “other federal agency” language still poses 
restraints because of the clause pertaining to the support of the “mission 
of the Department of Defense.”145 In fact, because the Blackwater guards 
involved in the 2007 Nisour Square massacre were technically under 
contract with the State Department, they could not be prosecuted under 
MEJA unless their employment in Iraq was related to supporting the 
Defense Department’s mission.146 
 
 137. Glenn R. Schmitt, Closing the Gap in Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilians Accompanying 
the Armed Forces Abroad—A First Person Account of the Creation of the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 55, 55-56 (2001). 
 138. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 
(2000) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67) [hereinafter MEJA]. 
 139. Christopher D. Belen, Reigning in Rambo: Prosecuting Crimes Committed by American 
Military Contractors in Iraq, 17 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 169, 176 (2008). 
 140. Id. at 178. 
 141. MEJA § 3261(a)(1). 
 142. Id. § 3267. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See MEJA § 3267(1)(A); Belen, supra note 139, at 180. 
 146. Belen, supra note 139, at 182. 
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Interestingly enough, in the press release following the unsealing of 
the Blackwater guard’s indictment, the Justice Department explicitly 
stated: 
The indictment represents the first prosecution under the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) to be filed against non-
Defense Department private contractors, which was not possible prior 
to the 2004 amendments to MEJA that specifically expanded the reach 
of MEJA to non-Defense Department contractors who provide 
services ‘in support of the mission of the Department of Defense 
overseas.’147 
While using MEJA was evidently successful in this situation, it is 
not as widely used as one might think. As of April 2008, the Justice 
Department had “received referrals of potential MEJA cases from both 
the Departments of Defense and State,” but of those cases, only “twelve 
have resulted in the filing of a Federal indictment, information or 
complaint.”148 In a Senate Committee address, the Justice Department 
specifically noted the challenge of “investigating and prosecuting serious 
crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan.”149 While acknowledging that 
“investigations in any foreign country face particular difficulties of 
language, evidence collection, logistical support, and coordination with a 
sovereign power,” the speaker went on to state that the “circumstances in 
Iraq and Afghanistan raise further obstacles,” such as security risks and 
difficulty locating willing witnesses.150 The speaker also attempted to use 
the “logistical challenges” as a sort of excuse as to why “investigations 
and prosecutions under MEJA may take significant time to complete.”151 
Obviously, such hurdles are not easily overcome because the nature of 
any investigation overseas always poses a number of complicated issues. 
Regardless, MEJA has not proven to be the missing link in PMSC 
regulation. 
 
 147. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Five Blackwater Employees Indicted on Manslaughter 
and Weapons Charges for Fatal Nisur Square Shooting in Iraq (Dec. 8, 2008), https://
www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-nsd-1068.html. 
 148. Closing Legal Loopholes: Prosecuting Sexual Assaults and Other Violent Crimes 
Committed Overseas by American Civilians in a Combat Environment Statement Before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. 3 (Apr. 9, 2008) (statement of Sigal P. Mandelker, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Crim. Division, Dep’t. of Just.) [hereinafter Closing Legal 
Loopholes]. 
 149. Id. at 4. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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III. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AS A SOLUTION  
As suggested above, the key to solving this problem is for states to 
each create domestic legislation modeled after the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA), enforceable through a treaty.152 The idea of a 
criminal statute with extraterritorial jurisdiction is nothing new. That 
being said, the FCPA has seen great success since it was first enacted by 
Congress in 1977, especially after its subsequent amendments.153 
Congress enacted the FCPA after discovering that several hundred 
corporations made “questionable or illegible payments” totaling an 
“excess of $300 million to foreign officials for a wide range of favorable 
actions on behalf of the companies.”154 The Act has two purposes, “to 
prohibit the bribery of foreign officials and to establish certain accounting 
requirements.”155 Both the Justice Department and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission enforce the Act.156 
The anti-bribery provisions prohibit the: (a) “use of the mails or any 
means of instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance 
of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of 
any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving 
of anything of value to” not only to any foreign official or foreign political 
party, but also to: 
(3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or 
thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or 
indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or 
official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office, for 
purposes of— 
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, 
political party, party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, 
(ii) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or 
candidate to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of 
such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate, or 
(iii) securing any improper advantage; or 
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or 
candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign government or 
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of 
 
 152. This article chooses to focus on the FCPA as a solution because of the recent success of 
the Justice Department’s Fraud Section in the handling of FCPA cases. 
 153. ROBIN MILLER, Construction and Application of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 
in AMERICAN LAW REPORTS (2nd ed. 2005) 
 154. Id. §2. 
 155. Id.; The latter purpose (accounting transparency requirements) will not be discussed in 
great detail in this article. 
 156. Id. 
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such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such domestic 
concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing 
business to, any person.157 
This language is relatively broad and all-encompassing of the 
conduct it seeks to not only punish, but also prevent. As expressed in a 
Senate Report and regularly quoted, “the criminalization of foreign 
corporate bribery will to a significant extent act as a self-enforcing, 
preventative mechanism.”158 The self-disclosure component of the FCPA 
is critical to its success. The idea of “‘soft’ enforcement generally refers 
to a law’s ability to facilitate self-policing and compliance to a greater 
degree than can be accomplished through ‘hard’ enforcement alone.”159 
Codes of conduct and compliance, like the Montreux Document and the 
ICoC, are great in theory, but they need to work in conjunction with some 
kind of formal and legally binding enforcement mechanism. The FCPA 
provides a model that accomplishes both goals. 
While prosecutors have pursued “corporate wrongdoers for FCPA 
violations,” there has also been a relatively recent push towards 
prosecuting individuals.160 Lanny A. Breuer, the former Assistant 
Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Criminal Division called 
the FCPA program “very robust” and described it as typifying how crime 
is approached in corporate America.161 The “aggressive prosecution of 
individuals” and the “prospect of significant prison sentences” should, in 
Breuer’s words, “make clear to every corporate executive, every board 
member, and every sales agent that we will seek to hold you personally 
accountable for FCPA violations.”162 Why shouldn’t that same sentiment 
be applied to corporate leaders that are at the helm of PMSCs? Without 
overgeneralizing, bribery, while a crime, pales in comparison to some of 
the heinous acts perpetrated by PMSC employees in the past, and 
truthfully, likely those that have yet to be committed. 
 
 157. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. §78dd (1977) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §78d-1 (1998)) [hereinafter FCPA]. 
 158. MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICE ACT IN A NEW ERA 24-25 (2014); 
The Success of “Soft Enforcement” In the U.K., FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 18, 2015) http://
fcpaprofessor.com/the-success-of-soft-enforcement-in-the-u-k/. 
 159. Koehler, supra note 158 at 311. 
 160. Jay Holtmeier, Kimberly Parker, & Robin Witten, 2012: Recent Trends in Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) Sentencing, LEXIS NEXIS: FCPA & COMPLIANCE LAW (Apr. 24, 
2012, 4:16 PM), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/corporate/b/fcpa-compliance/
archive/2012/04/24/2012-recent-trends-in-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-quot-fcpa-quot-
sentencing.aspx?Redirected=true 
 161. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Crim. Division, Dep’t. of Just., Address Before 
the American Bar Association National Institute on White Collar Crime (Feb. 25, 2010).  
 162. Id. 
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On September 9, 2015, Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates of 
the Justice Department issued a memorandum entitled, “Individual 
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing.”163 In keeping with the 
tradition of naming Justice Department policies after the deputy attorney 
generals who issue them, the individual accountability policy is 
commonly known as the “Yates Memo.”164 This announcement has been 
called a “loudly voiced retread of DOJ’s long-standing expectation that 
individuals committing crimes, even well-heeled business magnates, 
should be prosecuted.”165 
The memo itself “identified four principal goals: (1) deterring future 
illegal activity; (2) incentivizing change in corporate behavior; (3) 
ensuring the proper parties are held responsible for their actions; and (4) 
promoting public confidence in the justice system.”166 These goals 
parallel the objectives of the proposed treaty. Corporate individuals and 
business leaders should not be treated any differently than anyone else 
who breaks the law. At a conference in May 2016, Yates said, “holding 
accountable the people who committed the wrongdoing is essential if we 
are truly going to deter corporate misdeeds, have a real impact on 
corporate culture and ensure that the public has confidence in our justice 
system.”167 She went on to say, “[w]e cannot have a different system of 
justice—or the perception of a different system of justice—for corporate 
executives than we do for everyone else.”168 
IV. DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED TREATY 
While the idea of domestic legislation to be implemented by the 
treaty is modeled after the FCPA, the actual language of the legislation 
 
 163. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., Department of Justice, Individual 
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036
/download; see also Individual Accountability, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/dag/
individual-accountability [hereinafter Individual Accountability]. 
 164. Joan E. Meyer, 1 Year After Yates Memo: The DOJ’s Yates-Lite Approach, LAW360, (Oct. 
19, 2016), https://www.law360.com/health/articles/841773/1-year-after-yates-memo-the-doj-s-
yates-lite-approach. 
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(Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/yates-memo-doj-issues-questions-and-
answers.; see also Catherine Greaves, DOJ Stresses Individual Accountability in New “Yates 
Memo,” 12 A.B.A. HEALTH L. SEC. ESOURCE, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
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would need to be drafted. This article will not suggest specific wording; 
however, some ideas as to the basis of jurisdiction and superior liability 
are outlined below. 
Notably, the “FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions can apply to conduct 
both inside and outside the United States.”169 The “alternative 
jurisdiction” provision, enacted in 1998, “expanded the jurisdictional 
coverage of the Act by establishing an alternative basis for jurisdiction, 
that is, jurisdiction based on the nationality principle.”170 The FCPA also 
applies foreign nationals that “either directly or through an agent, engage 
in any act in furtherance of a corrupt payment (or an offer, promise, or 
authorization to pay) while in the territory of the United States.”171 Thus, 
the FCPA utilizes both a territorial and nationality-based approach to 
jurisdiction. The use of both allows for broader enforcement. Such an 
approach should be emulated by states enacting the legislation mandated 
by the proposed treaty. 
Holding superiors accountable for the actions of their subordinates 
is fairly common across the legal field. As far as the law of war is 
concerned, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court contains 
a specific article that details the “responsibility of commanders and other 
superiors.”172 Article 28 reads accordingly: 
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective 
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case 
may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such forces, where: 
That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution. 
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not 
described in paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible 
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by 
 
 169. DEP’T. OF JUST., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
11, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf 
[hereinafter FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
 170. Id. at 12. 
 171. Id. at 11. 
 172. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 28, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90. [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result 
of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such 
subordinates, where: 
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information 
which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or 
about to commit such crimes; 
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and 
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution.173 
While the exact wording would need to be adjusted, this language 
can serve as not only a kind of authority, but even a template of sorts for 
the proposed legislation. Despite the fact that this article is contained 
within the Rome Statute, which admittedly does not exactly have 
universal ratification, that does not undermine the useful nature of this 
idea—holding superiors responsible—which was in fact agreed upon by 
a large number of states.174 
Corporate executives and supervisors should be held accountable 
just as military commanders are under Article 28 of the Rome Statute. 
Considering that PMSCs have undeniable militaristic ties, especially 
today in their prevalence in areas of armed conflict in the Middle East, 
such accountability is far from an illogical leap. 
 CONCLUSION 
Private Military and Security Companies are not going anywhere 
any time soon. They are part of a multi-billion dollar industry, with roots 
tracing back centuries. While horrific events like the tragedy at Nisour 
Square are thankfully few and far between, there is really no way to know 
what kinds of crimes are being committed regularly by PMSC employees 
all over the world. Why wait for another massacre or grave injustice to 
occur? The approach should be proactive, not reactive. 
The FCPA was intended to promote compliance from within, much 
like the efforts set forth by the Montreux Document and the ICoC. 
However, the latter two are seriously lacking an effective enforcement 
system. What good are suggestions, guidelines, and good practices if 
there are no real consequences for noncompliance? There is arguably no 
real incentive to self-regulate and comply without the fear of prosecution 
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looming in the bounds. This mentality can be observed in the Justice 
Department’s robust usage of the FCPA to prosecute offenders and seek 
high prison sentences as a deterrent for future wrongdoers. 
States creating their own domestic legislation, with both territorial 
and national jurisdiction, will allow not only the perpetrators of such acts 
to be more readily prosecuted, but through language similar to Article 28 
of the Rome Statute, will also allow their superiors to face consequences. 
A treaty requiring states to create this legislation allows for uniformity 
across all states, ensuring that the playing field is as balanced and fair as 
possible. 
Why prosecute the superiors? Whether they are the supervisor on 
duty in a protection detail convoy or an executive interfacing with 
government agencies and negotiating huge contracts, they can easily be 
just as responsible and there should be a way to hold them accountable. 
The same way the bosses of individuals who bribe foreign officials are 
charged, so should the commanders of PMSC employees. While it is 
likely easier to prove that a supervisor on the ground “knew or should 
have known” from an evidentiary standpoint, the executives are just as 
culpable. Further, the amount of money involved is not without 
significance. Corners are cut when people seek to maximize profits and 
reduce costs. 
The proposed treaty would ideally prevent atrocities like what 
happened in Nisour Square from ever happening again because the fear 
of personal liability would be so strong. The threat of prosecution may be 
just the push PMSC’s need to police themselves and work towards 
compliance with not only the various guidelines already in place, but also 
the laws that would be implemented following the proposed treaty. 
Perhaps this will lead to increased training for personnel, both tactically 
and culturally. There is undoubtedly an expansive cultural disconnect 
between contractors, these pseudo-military operators, and the dignitaries 
they often protect, as well as the civilians they interact with. It would not 
be surprising if such a divide were to contribute to potential acts of 
violence perpetrated by PMSC contractors. Furthermore, the fact that 
many PMSC employees are former military members themselves opens 
the door to a discussion of mental illness, especially post-traumatic stress 
disorder, as seen in far too many soldiers post-service.175 Maybe this 
 
 175. Veterans Statistics: PTSD, Depression, TBI, Suicide., VETERANS AND PTSD (Sept. 20, 
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treaty will mark a movement toward helping former veterans turned 
private contractors get the help they need. 
Whatever policy implications result, the vast majority of them 
would be overall beneficial. Ultimately, this proposed treaty provides a 
way to uniformly close the gap that exists between the regulation and 
prosecution of PMSCs. Moreover, it would seemingly for the first time 
allow superiors, at times equally as culpable as those that “pull the 
trigger,” to be held to answer as well. But more than anything, it would 
be the final step towards global regulation and accountability that the 
international community attempted to solve through efforts like the 
Montreux Document and the ICoC. 
